Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2014

From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The
Afterlife of American Federalism
Jessica Bulman-Pozen
Columbia Law School, jbulma@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons

Recommended Citation
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of
American Federalism, 123 YALE L. J. 1920 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1848

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

the yale law journal

123:1920

2014

Jessica Bulman-Pozen

From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and
Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism
abstract. Announcing the death of dual federalism, Edward Corwin asked whether the
states could be “saved as the vital cells that they have been heretofore of democratic sentiment,
impulse, and action.” The federalism literature has largely answered in the affirmative.
Unwilling to abandon dual federalism’s commitment to state autonomy and distinctive interests,
scholars have proposed new channels for protecting these forms of state-federal separation. Yet
today state and federal governance are more integrated than separate. States act as coadministrators and co-legislatures in federal statutory schemes; they carry out federal law
alongside the executive branch and draft the law together with Congress. Lacking an
autonomous realm of action, states infuse federal law with diversity and competition, aligning
themselves with certain federal actors to oppose others. States also participate in national
political contests on behalf of Americans both inside and outside their borders. They facilitate
competition between the Democratic and Republican parties and offer staging grounds for
national networks seeking to advance their agendas through direct democracy. Instead of
focusing on state autonomy and distinctive interests, we should accordingly recognize
contemporary American federalism as an expression of our multifarious nationalism. This need
not lead us to answer Corwin’s question in the negative: precisely because states are
disaggregated sites of national governance, not separate sovereigns, they continue to serve as
vital cells of “democratic sentiment, impulse, and action.”

author. Associate Professor, Columbia Law School. I am grateful to Robert Ferguson,
Heather Gerken, Abbe Gluck, Kent Greenawalt, Bernard Harcourt, Jeremy Kessler, Alison
LaCroix, Tom Merrill, Gillian Metzger, Henry Monaghan, Jeff Powell, David Pozen, Judith
Resnik, Dan Richman, Cristina Rodríguez, Chuck Sabel, and participants in Columbia’s Faculty
Workshop for stimulating and clarifying conversations. I also thank Bridget Fahey and the
editors of the Yale Law Journal for wonderful editorial suggestions and Jeremy Girton for
excellent research assistance.
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introduction
Edward Corwin famously announced the passing of dual federalism in
February of 1950. In the wake of the Great Depression, the New Deal, and two
world wars, he argued that the federal system had “shifted base in the direction
of a consolidated national power” and wondered whether “the constituent
States of the System [could] be saved for any useful purpose.”1
Federalism scholars have offered a variety of answers to his question. For
some, the imperative is to revive dual federalism, a commitment to judicially
enforced separate spheres of state and federal authority.2 But for many more,
Corwin’s words have been read not as a eulogy but as a challenge, a call to
consider how federalism might survive without clearly delineated domains of
state and federal authority. If the “standard view held by students of law and
politics is that the history of American federalism has been an inexorable series
of moves in which national power has displaced state and local power,”3 many
of the contrarians who compose the federalism academy have found within the
very moves taken to aggrandize national power—in particular, the rise of the
administrative state and the rise of national political parties—the keys to
federalism’s longevity. Dual federalism made way for process federalism,4

1.
2.

3.
4.

Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 2, 23 (1950).
See id. at 4 (defining dual federalism); see also, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of
Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752
(1995) (defending dual federalism); John Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997) (same). For a few trenchant critiques, suggesting that even as a
historical matter dual federalism may owe more to an invented past than to actual practice,
see Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender and the
Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001); and Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution and the
Spending Power (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 420, 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228335.
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of
American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1356 (1994).
Broadly speaking, “process federalism” refers to theories that focus on the institutional
rules, structures, and practices through which the states and especially the federal
government act, rather than the substantive character of governmental action. See generally
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985) (“[T]he fundamental
limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the
‘States as States’ is one of process rather than one of result.”); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers
for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1364, 1386 (2001) (defining process federalism
as “reliance on political and institutional safeguards to preserve balance in the federal
structure,” and arguing that “[p]rocess federalism’s central insight is that the federal-state
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which has in turn recast administration and party politics as channels through
which state power is preserved. The administrative state and the two major
political parties have been reimagined as guardians, rather than slayers, of
American federalism.
This embrace of administration and politics has been productive but
incomplete. Even as the literature has ceased to insist on judicially enforced,
clearly defined spheres of state and federal authority, it has clung to a dualist
vision of state-federal separation. Dual federalism may be dead, but its focus on
autonomous state governance and distinctive state interests—on separation—
lives on. What has changed is simply the means of protecting these ends. In
our leading contemporary federalism narratives, integration paradoxically
yields separation: state actors use their connections to federal politicians and
administrators to safeguard state autonomy and to advance particularistic state
interests.
But integration yields integration, not separation. Taking administration
and partisanship seriously means we must acknowledge a certain incoherence
to invoking state governance and interests in opposition to federal governance
and interests. Instead, state and federal governance and interests are deeply
intertwined and, in many cases, indistinguishable. The state and federal
governments together produce national governance in the service of various
national interests.
First, in our most substantial federal statutory schemes, states act as coadministrators and even co-legislatures, complementing and competing with
the President and Congress. Insisting on an autonomous realm of state action
neglects this important aspect of today’s federalism and also leads us to
overlook how states affect the federal government. As administrators and
authors of federal law, states alter the roles and relationships of federal political
and bureaucratic actors and amplify competition across and within the
branches of the federal government. We cannot understand today’s federalism
without considering the separation of powers, and we likewise cannot
understand the separation of powers without considering federalism. Our
federal government is really a federalist government.
Second, and extending beyond state administration of federal law, states
participate in political controversies that are national in scope. They serve as
staging grounds for competition between our two major parties and for a

balance is affected not simply by what federal law is made, but by how that law is made”). I
elaborate on this definition and describe process federalism’s variants in Part I.
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variety of networked interests seeking to translate political commitments into
law. Insisting on distinctive state interests neglects this important aspect of
today’s federalism and also leads us to overlook how federalism facilitates
national political conflict. By advancing a Republican or Democratic agenda, or
by offering a toehold for networked interests to further their causes through
direct democracy, states engage in political struggles on behalf of people both
inside and outside their borders, and they are watched by Americans
nationwide. National political conflict is drawn on the canvas of the states.
To some, this may sound like nationalism, and not federalism. But it is not
nationalism as centralization and homogenization. Focusing on the states,
federalism scholarship tends to conceptualize the federal government as unified
and to treat the dominant voice in the federal government as the voice of a
single national interest. Our federal government and our nation are irreducibly
multifarious, however, and today’s federalism instantiates this national
diversity.
Understanding “federalism as the new nationalism”5 thus complicates both
the “federalism” and the “nationalism” sides of the equation. The phrase
should be taken to refer to a dynamic process of coevolution rather than the
colonization of states by the federal government, on the one hand, or the
preservation of federalism as state-federal separation, on the other. While
existing accounts locate federalism in state autonomy and distinctive interests
and proclaim it either dead or alive, this Essay instead locates federalism in the
legally and politically generative interaction among the state and federal
governments and the American people. Regarding the state and federal
governments as interdependent sites of national governance, it tells a story not
about the life or death of federalism as a rival to nationalism, but about
federalism’s afterlife as a form of nationalism.
Part I critiques the federalism literature’s dominant account of integrationas-separation. Part II considers state-federal integration in the administrative
realm, while Part III considers such integration with respect to partisan politics
and direct democracy. The Essay calls for an embrace of administration and
politics as transformative, rather than preservative, of American federalism.
Attending to how states pluralize our national life offers the most plausible
account of their contemporary vitality.

5.

Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889
(2014).
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i. the death and life of american federalism
Federalism scholarship in the latter half of the twentieth century and the
beginning of the twenty-first has largely resisted the easy narrative of federal
aggrandizement at the expense of the states. Acknowledging that the federal
government has assumed regulatory authority over ever more domains, the
literature has argued that this signifies not federalism’s demise but rather a
change in the mechanisms that safeguard the place of states in our system. A
variety of process federalisms have recast forces traditionally envisioned as
threats to a robust federalism as its guardians: Congress and the President, the
Democratic and Republican parties, and the administrative state have each, in
turn, been given a new role. But even as these recastings shed dual federalism’s
insistence on judicial review and clearly delineated spheres of state and federal
authority, they retain its core commitment to state autonomy and distinctive
interests. Novel forms of state-federal integration are thus treated as means of
preserving state-federal separation: the integration of state and federal actors
safeguards the separation of state and federal action.
A. Congress and the President, Political Parties, and the Administrative State:
Recasting Threats
Just as Corwin announced dual federalism’s passing, a new wave of
scholarship began to proclaim federalism alive and well. The key, adherents of
process federalism insisted, was to look beyond a judicially enforced model of
state sovereignty to the protections accorded states through their role in the
composition and selection of the federal government.6 The political safeguards
that Herbert Wechsler described in 1954 were not newly discovered—as
Wechsler acknowledged, James Madison had sketched them nearly two
centuries earlier7—but they assumed new urgency as critics worried about the
vitality of American federalism.
Wechsler’s main conceptual move was to re-envision a looming threat to
state power as a safeguard. On the dual federalist account, Congress and the

6.
7.

See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
See id. at 546-47; THE FEDERALIST NOS. 45, 46, at 291, 296 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 435 (1819) (“The people of
all the States, and the States themselves, are represented in Congress, and, by their
representatives, exercise this power.”).
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President were precisely what the states had to fear: these federal actors would
overreach and impinge on state sovereignty absent a judicial check; with the
demise of that check, Americans were destined to inhabit a world of
unconstrained federal power. Process federalism first neutralized the threat. In
Wechsler’s view, state law was the default and those who favored federal
intervention bore the burden of persuasion, ensuring federal law remained
interstitial. He then went further: the branches of the federal government
could be counted on affirmatively to preserve state autonomy because the states
selected their members. The formal state role in choosing Senators and, to a
lesser extent, members of the House through districting and the President
through the Electoral College, he argued, gave federal politicians incentives to
avoid encroaching “on the domain of the states.”8 While for Corwin, the
aggrandizement of congressional and presidential power threatened
federalism’s survival, for Wechsler and his followers, congressional and
presidential power would themselves be marshaled in support of state
autonomy.9
By the end of the twentieth century, notwithstanding its star turn before
the Supreme Court,10 Wechsler’s formal process federalism had lost some of its
luster. One problem, critics pointed out, was that the constitutional structures
he emphasized were already on their last legs when he wrote. Senators had
long been chosen directly by the people; state legislative control over districting
for the House was curtailed by the reapportionment cases of the 1960s; and
even Wechsler couldn’t muster much of an argument for the Electoral
College.11 But a deeper problem, critics maintained, was that these structural
safeguards at best protected geographically concentrated interests, not the
autonomy of state institutions. In other words, Wechsler’s process federalism
failed to protect federalism.12 The hunt was on for new safeguards.
Two more practical contenders quickly emerged. Kicking off process
federalism’s second wave, Larry Kramer argued that the political party was the

8.
9.
10.
11.

12.

Wechsler, supra note 6, at 558.
See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980);
see also infra note 26 (citing other contemporary process accounts).
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). But cf. New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
Wechsler also did not attend to other historical developments, including the passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment, which authorized the federal income tax and thus vastly increased
the federal government’s ability both to act in its own right and to purchase state
cooperation.
See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 2, at 222; Young, supra note 4, at 1357-58.
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most important institution of American federalism. The formal structures
Wechsler posited were not up to the task; instead, the nitty-gritty politics that
animated them were the real political safeguards of federalism. The Democratic
and Republican parties, Kramer argued, are loose confederations of national,
state, and local organizations, lacking ideological and programmatic discipline.
Candidates at each level depend on assistance from party organizations and
officials at the other levels, and this mutual dependence leads them to respect
one another’s concerns. In particular, federal politicians’ reliance on their state
co-partisans to get and remain elected makes them respect the desires of state
officials, desires that include the protection of state autonomy.13
Like Wechsler’s formal variant of process federalism, Kramer’s informal
one recast a threat to the state-federal balance as, in fact, its redeemer. The
framing vision, Kramer maintained, assumed a natural antagonism between
state and federal politicians, and because the former would enjoy more popular
support, they would have an advantage in turf wars with Congress. But this
natural antagonism was undermined by the rise of national political parties,
which the Framers had not foreseen: “The ‘natural’ fault line between state and
federal officials was soon bridged by cross-cutting attachments based on
ideology and party affiliation, and the most important anticipated source of
protection for states was promptly rendered ineffective.”14 If parties posed a
threat to state autonomy in this respect, however, Kramer suggested that they
were ultimately a boon for it. Properly understood, political parties
safeguarded federalism by “link[ing] the fortunes of federal officeholders to
state politicians and parties” in a way that “assured respect for state
sovereignty.”15 Much as Wechsler had reimagined Congress and the President
as protectors of state autonomy, so Kramer reimagined the national political
parties as protectors of state autonomy.
Perhaps the most pronounced inversion of menace into safeguard has
emerged in the administrative realm. The rise of the administrative state has
long been viewed as the principal threat to American federalism. The growth of
federal power that Corwin and his contemporaries emphasized, for instance,
was largely the growth of administrative power; it was the executive branch,
including a host of new agencies, that assumed regulatory authority over
traditional state domains, from welfare and health, to education and safety, to

13.
14.
15.

See Kramer, supra note 2, at 278-87; Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1485, 1522-42 (1994).
Kramer, supra note 2, at 269.
Id. at 276.
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housing and the environment.16 But federalism scholars have in recent years
recast the administrative state as not only consistent with but also a protector
of federalism by extending the process literature’s logic to administration.
While the classic political safeguards account posits that Congress protects
state autonomy, the administrative federalism account argues that federal
agencies do so. Taking seriously Corwin’s argument that the centralization of
power in the federal system was accompanied by a transfer of power within the
federal government from the legislative to the executive branch, scholars
including Gillian Metzger, Catherine Sharkey, and Brian Galle and Mark
Seidenfeld have suggested it is better for the states to have administrative
agencies on their side than to rely on Congress alone. Indeed, they maintain,
agencies are not only necessary adjuncts to Congress but the institutions best
positioned to protect the states.17 Focusing on notice-and-comment rulemaking
in particular, these scholars argue that administrative law requirements
including solicitation of and response to public comments make agencies more
transparent, deliberative, and accountable than Congress and better able to
engage in dialogue with state governmental entities about the impact of federal
regulation on the states.18 On this view, the expansion of federal administrative
authority need not be a substitute for state autonomy; it may instead be the
vehicle through which state autonomy is protected.

16.

17.

18.

See Corwin, supra note 1, at 2 (“[W]ithin the National Government itself an increased flow
of power in the direction of the President has ensued.”); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Vast accretions of federal
power, eroded from that reserved by the States, have magnified the scope of presidential
activity.”).
See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation,
and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 2020 (2008) (concluding that
agencies outperform Congress in allocating policymaking authority between the federal and
state governments); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE
L.J. 2023, 2080-83 (2008) (stating that agencies may do as well as Congress and better than
the federal courts at preserving a meaningful state regulatory role); Catherine M. Sharkey,
Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2127-28 (2009)
(arguing that federal agencies, and not Congress, are “the best possible protectors of state
regulatory interests”). For one response to these arguments, see Stuart Minor Benjamin &
Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57
DUKE L.J. 2111 (2008).
See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 1949-83; Sharkey, supra note 17, at 2129, 214950, 2163-70; see also Metzger, supra note 17, at 2080-81 (challenging the conventional
wisdom that Congress is more sensitive to state prerogatives than are federal agencies);
Sharkey, supra note 17, at 2172-91 (suggesting reforms to the agency rulemaking process that
would facilitate more meaningful state-federal dialogue).
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B. Integration as Separation
With the shift from sovereignty to process, the three forces deemed most
threatening to American federalism—Congress and the President, national
political parties, and the administrative state—have thus been neutralized and
recast as safeguards. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the “federalism” secured by each
of these moves has required some reconceptualization. Most formal definitions
of federalism, for instance, provide that each level of government must be
sovereign in at least one policy realm and that such sovereignty must be
constitutionally entrenched.19 But process scholars have unmoored federalism
from constitutionally fixed spheres of state and federal action. A successful
federalism, the literature maintains, does not require ex ante specification of a
domain of exclusive state authority.20 Closely related, process theories argue
that judicial enforcement of federalism is, at least largely, unnecessary. In
contrast to the dualist suggestion that judicial review is a life or death matter
for the states,21 process scholars contend that political actors may be relied
upon to mediate the federal-state bargain.22
Even as it has conceded much to reconcile federalism with the substantial
powers of Congress and the President, the nationwide operation of two major
political parties, and the rise of the administrative state, however, the process
federalism literature has clung to a dualist core of state-federal separation. As
this Section explores, it continues to insist on such separation in two closely
related ways. First, as a matter of state autonomy: federalism is considered
secure as long as states enjoy a space in which to set their own policies without
the federal government’s interference. While this space is not the fixed
sovereign sphere of dual federalism, scholars nonetheless demand some
domain in which states have exclusive regulatory authority. The departure

19.

20.
21.
22.

See, e.g., JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN 18-19 (2009)
(defining federalism to require the constitutionally declared sovereignty of state and federal
governments in at least one policy realm each); WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN,
OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 11 (1964) (defining federalism to require at least one area of
action in which state and federal governments are each guaranteed autonomy).
See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 2; Wechsler, supra note 6; Young, supra note 4.
See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709,
1720 (1985).
See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 9; Kramer, supra note 2; Wechsler, supra note 6. Some process
theories contemplate more robust judicial review. See, e.g., Andrzej Rapaczynski, From
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341;
Young, supra note 4.
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from dualism thus inheres not in the rejection of an exclusive state domain, but
only in the extent to which this domain is fixed versus fluid and judicially
protected rather than secured through more informal means.23 Second, process
federalism venerates distinctive state interests: we need federalism because state
residents have different preferences from the national populace and residents of
other states. These two concepts are closely related and often conflated:
autonomous state governance is valued because it allows state populations to
advance their particularistic interests.
Understanding federalism in terms of state autonomy and distinctive
interests, various process narratives posit political representation, partisanship,
and administration as guarantors of such state-federal separation. If scholars
have saved federalism from the looming danger of the national by recasting
threats as safeguards, they have largely done so by treating integration as a
means of separation. Radical as Wechsler’s account was in certain respects, for
example, he focused on the preservation of state autonomy.24 To be sure, such
autonomy would not be guaranteed by the courts; it would have to be fought
for in Congress. And its sphere would not be neatly defined; it would be
contested and shifting. But, at bottom, the political safeguards of federalism
protected a type of state power similar to that championed by dual federalism.25

23.

24.

25.

See generally ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 87-89 (2009) (critiquing process federalism for continuing to
delineate distinct areas of state and federal activity); Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court
2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (2010) (“The de
facto autonomy lauded by the process federalists looks remarkably like the de jure autonomy
lauded by sovereignty’s champions. Both theories depict power as the ability to preside over
one’s own empire . . . .”).
At times, Wechsler suggested Congress will safeguard federalism only insofar as the
American people care about federalism. Wechsler, supra note 6, at 547 (“To the extent that
federalist values have real significance they must give rise to local sensitivity to central
intervention; to the extent that such a local sensitivity exists, it cannot fail to find reflection
in the Congress.”). In other words, by blurring the distinction between state autonomy and
state interests, he anticipated Kramer’s critique that his process federalism would protect
only geographically concentrated interests, not the formal autonomy of state institutions.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
This is why Roderick Hills has argued that “‘political process’ theories of constitutional
federalism are not really theories of federalism at all but theories of judicial review”—they
differ from dualist sovereignty-based accounts only with respect to how, not whether, to
protect state autonomy. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 81, 821 (1998); see also Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1549, 1556 (2012) (“Both sovereignty and process federalism are theories of federalism. But
the core difference between them turns on how best to protect state power, not on what form
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What was different was the means by which it would be ensured. Instead of
relying on separation to yield separation, Wechsler’s process federalism was a
theory of integration yielding separation: the relationships of state and federal
actors would guarantee autonomous arenas for state and federal action.26
Kramer’s party-based account likewise defined the success of process
federalism with reference to dual federalism. Just as Wechsler’s critique of
dualism did not disturb its animating vision of state autonomy, Kramer’s
critique of Wechsler’s formal process federalism preserved this vision; Kramer
simply insisted that Wechsler’s safeguards were insufficient to protect state
autonomy. Political parties, he argued, were the true safeguard of federalism.
His claim was not that partisan ties lead federal officials to respect the
substantive interests of state politicians in, say, regulating pollution, lowering
taxes, or providing early childhood education; it was, rather, that they lead
federal officials to respect the authority of state institutions to advance these
particular interests themselves.27 Indeed, Kramer mocked the idea that state
interests could be furthered by the federal government: “So far as I am aware,
no one defends federalism on the ground that it makes national representatives
sensitive to private interests organized along state or local lines. Rather,
federalism is meant to preserve the regulatory authority of state and local
institutions to legislate policy choices.”28 Like Wechsler, Kramer stripped away

26.

27.
28.

of state power we ought to be protecting if federalism’s ends are to be achieved.”); supra
note 23.
Wechsler’s contemporary heirs, who have offered a variety of nuanced accounts that focus
on Congress and formal safeguards, similarly champion state-federal separation. See, e.g.,
Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1325
(2001) (arguing that the separation of powers protects federalism in the form of “state
governance prerogatives”); Vicki Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz
and Principle, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2228 (1998) (“To make political safeguards of
federalism work, some sense of enforceable lines must linger.”); Rapaczynski, supra note 22,
at 380 (arguing that Garcia’s process federalism “is by no means inimical” to National League
of Cities’s emphasis on state autonomy “despite the seemingly contradictory holdings in
these two cases”); Young, supra note 4, at 1358 n.42 (arguing that “the independent
policymaking authority of state governments” is the “critical variable” for federalism); see
also Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 741-42 (2004)
(assuming that “federalism values, such as ensuring core state regulatory authority and
autonomy, are important and can be protected through political processes” and noting that
Congress in particular may appreciate the “intrinsic value of preserving core state regulatory
authority”).
For a critique of Kramer’s argument on its own terms, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan
Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1083-89 & n.18 (2014).
Kramer, supra note 2, at 222.

1930

the afterlife of american federalism

sovereignty-through-judicial-review but retained the aspirational core of state
autonomy.29 States would further their distinctive interests through their own
governance, not through their participation in national politics. And, also like
Wechsler, Kramer insisted that integration of one sort yields separation of
another: the integration of state and federal officials through confederated
parties leads them to respect each other’s separate domains.
The administrative variant of process federalism similarly understands
integration as a basis for ensuring state-federal separation. Scholars who argue
that state regulatory authority may be protected within the administrative
realm generally do not claim that states can ensure the substantive goals
favored by their residents are realized through federal administration. They
reason, rather, that federal agencies may carve out space for states to
autonomously further their particular interests.30 This is a closely contained
state domain—one nestled within the administrative state and coming largely
at the mercy of federal bureaucrats and politicians—but it is a separate domain
all the same. The argument, that is, continues to define federalism in terms of
state autonomy and distinctive interests. And like Wechsler’s and Kramer’s
versions of process federalism, administrative federalism, too, regards statefederal integration as the basis for state-federal separation: the close
connections between federal and state administrators are what incline the
federal bureaucracy to respect state autonomy.31

29.

30.

31.

See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 13, at 1499 (“[J]ust because it’s no longer possible to maintain a
fixed domain of exclusive state jurisdiction it’s not necessarily impossible to maintain a fluid
one.”).
See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 1965-73 (noting that agencies may appreciate
the benefits of allowing autonomous state regulation); id. at 1985 (“In preserving local
autonomy against a single, national rule, federalism offers citizens with differing preferences
the opportunity to craft a local rule that most nearly accords with their values.”); Metzger,
supra note 17, at 2029 (arguing that administrative agencies are not “ill-suited to protecting
state regulatory autonomy”). In other work, Metzger has offered an argument for statefederal integration more congenial to the one I advance here. See Gillian E. Metzger,
Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2011) (arguing that in certain
Supreme Court preemption decisions, federalism serves as a mechanism for enhancing
federal agency performance).
See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 1954-61, 1971-74 (considering interactions
between agency and state officials in the notice-and-comment process); Sharkey, supra note
17, at 2149-50 (arguing that agency experts are able to engage with state actors in a
“meaningful and substantive way”).
An important body of scholarship I have omitted from this account is the cooperative
federalism literature, which likewise considers states’ relationship to federal administration.
I have bracketed it thus far because most of the literature focuses on discrete policy areas
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C. Integration as Integration
Process scholarship has offered tremendously valuable insights into
contemporary federalism, but it is a mistake to believe that national political
parties and the administrative state preserve autonomous state governance and
distinctive state interests. Administrative and political integration do not yield
state-federal separation. They yield ever-more thoroughgoing state-federal
integration as states become sites of national policymaking and partisan
conflict. In process scholarship’s insistence that new conditions have preserved
American federalism, we have largely missed both how our federalism has
changed and how our nationalism has changed along with it.
States today serve as disaggregated sites of national governance in two
main respects. First, they are component parts of the national administrative
apparatus. In our major statutory schemes, states carry out federal law
alongside the executive branch and write the law alongside Congress. This
state role challenges depictions of states as autonomous governments. In
critical areas, states do not enjoy a realm in which to set their own policies;
instead, they set national policy together with federal politicians and
bureaucrats.
Second, states facilitate competition between the Democratic and
Republican parties and offer staging grounds for national networks seeking to
further their agendas. This state role challenges depictions of state interests as
distinct from national interests. Instead of advancing particularistic
commitments, states often give concrete form to interests that exist throughout

rather than federalism theory and thus grapples with a different set of questions. See
Gerken, supra note 23, at 18-19 (noting that cooperative federalism scholarship tends to
focus on “improving policymaking in a discrete subject area rather than theorizing about”
federalism, and citing relevant scholarship). Key exceptions—some expressly discussing
cooperative federalism and some discussing other forms of state-federal concurrency—
include works by contributors to this Feature and a handful of other scholars, whose
writings I draw on in what follows. See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR
WITHIN (2011); SCHAPIRO, supra note 23; Bulman-Pozen, supra note 27; Jessica BulmanPozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); Gerken,
supra note 23; Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011); Judith
Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple
Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local
in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008). Notably, even some of the most
sophisticated thinkers about cooperative federalism programs search within them for state
autonomy. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 25 (arguing that state autonomy should be protected in
cooperative federalism schemes).
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the nation; functioning as a single platform on which political disputes play
out for the American people, they enable a variety of national publics
to emerge.32
The remainder of this Essay explores ways in which contemporary
federalism is best understood in terms of integration, not separation.33 States’
role in administering federal law and framing national political competition
calls into question the federalism literature’s many arguments that integration
preserves separation while offering new opportunities to consider how states
produce national governance. Taking administration and politics seriously
reveals how states shape the balance and exercise of power within the federal
government, as well as how they facilitate national partisan competition and
nationwide political change.
ii. administration: federalism as the separation of
powers
The federal government’s move, particularly with the social revolutions of
the New Deal and Great Society, to regulate in areas traditionally occupied by
the states has, in turn, bound up states in the administration of federal law.
The dynamic is one of mutual empowerment more than federal
aggrandizement: as the fourth branch grows, so too does the states’ role grow
within it.34 States furnish administrative capacity and democratic legitimacy,

32.

33.

34.

See generally JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 126 (1927) (“Indirect, extensive,
enduring and serious consequences of conjoint and interacting behavior call a public into
existence having a common interest in controlling these consequences. But the machine age
has so enormously expanded, multiplied, intensified and complicated the scope of the
indirect consequences . . . that the resultant public cannot identify and distinguish itself. . . .
There are too many publics and too much of public concern for our existing resources to
cope with.”).
I should be clear that I do not mean to deny the possibility of state autonomy or distinctive
state interests. There remain areas in which states set policy without the federal
government’s involvement, and there are interests that are especially resonant in certain
states based on demographics, industry, geography, and the like. My argument is a
narrower one: that state autonomy and distinctive interests are not the only, or even the
most important, components of contemporary federalism, and that administration and
politics, in particular, do not safeguard these forms of state-federal separation but rather
exert a powerful integrative force.
See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 459, 498-500 (2012); Gluck, supra note 31; cf. Heinz Eulau, Polarity in
Representational Federalism: A Neglected Theme of Political Theory, 3 PUBLIUS 153, 165-70
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bolstering the ability of the federal government to achieve its objectives. But
they also inject diversity, contestation, and a degree of chaos, mild or
otherwise,35 into national governance. Rather than a federal executive branch
solely responsible for carrying out national programs, we see states serving as
co-administrators, frequently challenging the federal executive’s exercise of its
statutory authority. States also increasingly serve as a shadow federal
legislature, rewriting substantial portions of statutory schemes subject to
waivers from the federal executive. Here too, our federal government becomes
federalist as states vary the content of national programs and push back against
congressional decisions.
The state role in administering and authoring federal law complicates
conceptions of federalism grounded in autonomy. As the cooperative
federalism literature has long noted, a separate space for state action is nowhere
to be found in the many programs that intertwine state and federal
governance.36 In thinking about states’ role in federal statutory schemes,
however, we have not paid sufficient attention to divisions within the federal
government—whether across the branches, as this Part contemplates, or along
other dimensions, such as partisan politics, as the next Part explores.
Breaking open the national side of cooperative federalism illuminates two
important dynamics. First, it reveals that the diversity and competition
generated by state administration of federal law do not follow from statefederal separateness. Instead, states ally themselves with certain federal actors
and interests in order to oppose others. Diversity that also exists within the
federal government assumes concrete form in the fifty states. Second, taking

35.

36.

(1973) (arguing that our federal structure is not a dual structure but a “polar structure” so
that there is “no centralization without decentralization”); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism
Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567, 569 (2011) (“Rather than assertions of federal
power at the expense of the states, the central dynamic evident under the Obama
administration to date is more active government, at both the national and state level.”).
See MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 385 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., Transaction
Publishers 1984) (1966) (“The preservation of mild chaos is an important goal for the
American federal system.”).
See, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES (2d ed. 1972);
GRODZINS, supra note 35; Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 31; Philip J. Weiser, Towards
a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001). On
concurrent jurisdiction generally, see RYAN, supra note 31; and SCHAPIRO, supra note 23.
Moreover, as Abbe Gluck points out, the federal government may design cooperative
federalism programs to promote federal power: state administration may be “a specific
strategy used by the federal government to strengthen its new federal laws and the federal
norms they introduce.” Gluck, supra note 31, at 565.
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states seriously as national actors reveals that the separation of powers and
checks and balances at the federal level are shaped by an actor outside the
branches of the federal government. If we cannot fully understand today’s
federalism without parsing the federal government, neither can we fully
understand today’s separation of powers without considering the states.
A. States as Another Executive Branch
The main role states play in federal statutory schemes is as administrators
of national programs, a sort of second executive branch operating alongside the
President and the D.C. bureaucracy. Through its conditional spending and
conditional preemption powers, and often a combination of the two, Congress
has brought states into the administration of the United States’ most
substantial statutory schemes. States exercise concurrent authority with the
federal executive in social welfare programs like Medicaid and the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act; environmental programs like the Clean Air
Act and the Clean Water Act; and a host of other schemes from immigration to
telecommunications to financial regulation.37
While these programs often travel under the label “cooperative federalism,”
state actors do not always cooperate with their federal counterparts; their
actions are often decidedly uncooperative.38 But such uncooperative behavior is
rarely framed in terms of state versus federal authority as such. Instead,
states tend to fight with the federal executive branch about the meaning of the
statute Congress has designed and the allocation of federal authority. We
witness debates about federalism that are really debates about the separation of
powers.39
Consider two examples from recent years: state opposition to the Bush
Administration’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and to the
Obama Administration’s immigration policies. The Clean Air Act authorizes

37.

38.
39.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012) (immigration); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006) (Clean Water
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006) (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (2006) (Clean Air Act);
47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(5) (2006) (telecommunications); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1042(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 2012-14 (2010)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552 (2012)) (financial regulation); Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1101, 1311, 1321, 124 Stat. 119, 141-43, 173-79, 186
(2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001, 18031, 18041) (healthcare). See generally
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 34, at 472-76; Gluck, supra note 31.
See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 31.
See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 34.
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both the Environmental Protection Agency and California to adopt vehicle
emissions standards.40 Because the state’s power to regulate is secured by a
federal statute, this scheme frames regulatory disputes between the state and
federal executive in terms of the congressional grant of authority, not state
autonomy. When the Bush EPA declined to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
and also denied California the waiver that would have allowed the state to
regulate such emissions, California insisted that it was attempting to faithfully
implement the Clean Air Act while the federal executive branch disregarded the
statute. Its argument had less to do with federalism than with the distribution
of federal authority: state officials argued that the Bush Administration was
abdicating its statutory duty to regulate such admissions and that the state was
seeking to vindicate congressional intent.41
Arizona’s recent fight with the Obama Administration concerning
immigration policy has had much the same character. Arizona’s SB 1070 would
have, among other things, made it a crime to be in Arizona without carrying
registration papers, required police to determine a person’s immigration status
during a stop upon reasonable suspicion that the person was unlawfully
present, and allowed police to make warrantless arrests of persons they
believed to have committed certain crimes.42 In defending the state law,
Arizona did not challenge federal authority over immigration or insist on state
autonomy. Just the opposite: it claimed the mantle of Congress and argued
that it, and not the federal executive branch, was seeking to execute federal
immigration law as Congress intended. The problem, Arizona argued, was that
the federal executive was not carrying out federal immigration law to its fullest
extent. And, it continued, Congress had lent states authority to cooperate in
immigration enforcement so as to avoid such laggardness.43

40.

41.
42.
43.

California may adopt more stringent vehicle emission standards than the federal
Environmental Protection Agency if it is granted a waiver, and the statutory scheme makes a
waiver grant the default. 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2006); see H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 23 (1977)
(noting that the provision “would require the Administrator in most instances to waive the
preemption under section 209 of the act with respect to California’s standards”).
See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 34, at 480-81, 487, 489-90.
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
See, e.g., Appellants’ Opening Brief at 1-2, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 10-16645) (“The Department of Homeland Security (‘DHS’) has demonstrated
its inability (or unwillingness) to enforce the federal immigration laws effectively. The Act’s
primary purpose, therefore, is to enhance the assistance Arizona and its law enforcement
officers provide in enforcing federal immigration laws. The Arizona Legislature carefully
crafted the Act to ensure that Arizona’s officers would do so in compliance with existing
federal laws . . . . The fundamental premise of the United States’ argument is that DHS has
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As both the Clean Air Act and immigration examples suggest, when states
want to carry out federal law differently from the federal executive, their most
powerful objection sounds not in federalism, but rather in the separation of
powers: they try to tar the federal executive’s choices as inconsistent with the
statute that governs state and federal action alike. Rather than challenge the
raw exercise of federal power, states instead challenge the faithfulness of the
executive to the statutory scheme. They rely on power granted to them by one
part of the federal government to contest the decisions of another part, and,
whether rightly or wrongly, they cast themselves as Congress’s faithful agents,
in contrast to a wayward executive branch.44
This state role is thus quite different from a traditional federalism
conception pitting autonomous states against an autonomous federal
government; integration, not separation, is key. Because a state’s strongest
claim of right when it disagrees with the federal executive about how to carry
out federal law comes from an appeal to the underlying statute, the federal
law—and not arguments about state power as such—is where states turn
regardless of what is motivating their challenges. Whether in private
conversations between state and federal administrators, discussions mediated
by legislators or the public, or filings in lawsuits, states trying to affect the
federal executive’s decisions or chart a different course force the federal
executive to defend itself with reference to the congressional grant of authority.
Parsing the federal government proves critical to understanding state
challenges.

44.

exclusive authority to determine whether and to what extent it may receive assistance from
state and local authorities in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. The United
States’ position, however, is contradicted by express directives from Congress . . . .”);
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 34, at 490-91. On the integration of state and federal immigration
regulation generally, see Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Integrated Regime of Immigration
Regulation, in WRITING IMMIGRATION: SCHOLARS AND JOURNALISTS IN DIALOGUE 44
(Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco et al. eds., 2011).
Other examples of such claims abound. In a case pending before the Supreme Court this
Term, for instance, a group of states is arguing that the EPA’s Transport Rule, which
imposes emissions reduction responsibilities on upwind states based on their contributions
to downwind states’ air quality problems, violates the Clean Air Act. See EPA v. EME
Homer City Generation, L.P., Nos. 12-1182 & 12-1183 (U.S. argued Dec. 10, 2013). Instead of
offering arguments about federal encroachment on state authority as such, these challenger
states are fighting with the EPA about the meaning of the Clean Air Act, insisting that they
are attempting to comply with the statute while the EPA flouts Congress’s instruction. See
Brief for the State and Local Respondents, EME Homer City Generation, Nos. 12-1182 & 121183.
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Recognizing this intersection between federalism and the separation of
powers does not only reorient our thinking about federalism; it also helps us to
think differently about the separation of powers.45 The rise of the
administrative state has long fueled concerns about the aggrandizement of
executive power and the attendant demise of the separation of powers and
checks and balances within the federal government.46 As Corwin himself
observed, the passing of dual federalism was also the passing of a particular
vision of the separation of powers: “the Federal system has shifted base in the
direction of a consolidated national power, while within the National
Government itself an increased flow of power in the direction of the President
has ensued.”47 But these two concerns may answer more than exacerbate one
another. Because states have been folded into the federal executive branch,
state administration of federal law reproduces checks and balances within the
enlarged executive domain.
Sometimes these checks and balances revolve directly around Congress.
State administration of federal law may substitute for congressional
monitoring of its delegates, forcing both state and federal administrators to
defend their decisions in terms of the underlying statute. Often, however, a
focus on Congress will not yield much. Especially with respect to the broad
delegations that exercise critics of the administrative state, Congress’s intent
may simply be that its delegates make the hard decisions. The very feature that
leads to executive aggrandizement in the first instance also complicates efforts
to cabin executive power with reference to congressional intent. The Clean Air
Act, for example, confers substantial discretion on the executive branch,
providing that regulation should ensue when in the EPA Administrator’s
“judgment” emissions “cause or contribute to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”48 Executive

45.

46.

47.
48.

As Abbe Gluck’s work illuminates, recognizing a federalism that comes at the “grace of
Congress” also helps us to think differently about the interpretive doctrines of legislation
and administrative law. See Gluck, supra note 31, at 542; Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National]
Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014).
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010);
PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2009); Martin Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996);
Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
123 (1994); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006).
Corwin, supra note 1, at 2.
42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2006). But cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)
(holding that the EPA has authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas
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discretion is even more pronounced in the realm of immigration given that
enforcement questions are by default subject to the executive’s policy choices,
resource allocation, and particular judgments. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Arizona v. United States rests on the view that Congress intended the
federal executive to set enforcement priorities and thus that federal legislative
and executive choices cannot be parsed in the way the state argued.49
Coming up against the limits of traditional separation of powers analysis,
state administration in such cases does not so much influence the relationship
of the federal executive and legislative branches as generate, at one remove, the
competition that is lacking between these branches. Rather than checks and
balances between Congress and the federal executive, we see checks and
balances between the states and the federal executive. State administration tees
up both disputes about the powers and intentions of the branches of the federal
government and nationwide public debates about federal law. It forces the
executive branch to have conversations it wants to avoid. As these
conversations are broadcast nationwide, the lines between state and federal
become further blurred. The challenger state and federal executive each find
supporters and detractors throughout the country, embedded in the federal
government and state governments alike.50
When California sought to regulate greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to
federal statutory authority, for instance, it forced the Bush Administration to
defend its actions before a broad public. The EPA had to offer detailed reasons
for its decisions and justify its preferred policies in ways it might have
sidestepped were it the sole administrator of the law. And it found itself a
target not only of angry state politicians, but also of angry federal politicians
who agreed with the state’s substantive commitments and hauled agency
officials in to testify. The controversy also generated substantial public debate,

49.

50.

emissions and must decide whether to regulate such emissions based on whether they
contribute to climate change, not other prudential and policy considerations).
But see Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]o
say, as the Court does, that Arizona contradicts federal law by enforcing applications of the
Immigration Act that the President declines to enforce boggles the mind.”). See generally
Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012 SUP. CT. REV.
31, 33 (noting that the Arizona decision “consolidates tremendous immigration policymaking
power in the executive branch, endorsing the idea that immigration law is centrally the
product of executive ‘lawmaking’ that bears little relation to immigration law on the
books”).
For more on these alignments and some thoughts on the real axis of division, see the
discussion of partisanship, infra Section III.A.
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as the state-federal tussle crystallized the issues. This was no mere academic
dispute: a state was ready to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the
Clean Air Act and, for better or worse depending on one’s view, the EPA was
standing in its way.
When Arizona sought to ramp up enforcement of federal immigration law,
it similarly forced a conversation that the Obama Administration was not sure
it wanted to have.51 To invalidate Arizona’s law, the federal executive branch
had to spell out its own decisions about immigration enforcement. While the
President invoked statutory grants of authority and congressional priorities, he
also suggested that with a gridlocked Congress, it had fallen to his
Administration to shape immigration policy. But with states like Arizona
contesting federal policy and seeking to enforce their own schemes, the
Administration could not simply cite executive discretion. It had to defend its
policy commitments and priorities before both the Supreme Court and
the nation.
B. States as Another Congress
States do not only reproduce checks and balances within the executive’s
domain. They also stand in more directly for Congress as authors of federal
law, drafting new versions of federal provisions when Congress permits them
to do so. This state role is particularly apparent with respect to what David
Barron and Todd Rakoff have recently called “big waiver.” Instead of
empowering agencies to set policy when Congress has left a gap, as traditional
delegation would have it, big waiver grants agencies the power to decide
whether the rules Congress has adopted should be dispensed with or replaced.
It is the delegation of the power to unmake and change law Congress has

51.

No doubt some officials feared public backlash from opposing Arizona’s law. Indeed, some
commentators predicted that the state law would achieve its main effects by making the
federal executive branch enforce federal immigration law more aggressively than it wished
to: once the state had brought to federal officials’ attention an unlawfully present individual
and enlisted federal cooperation in confirming the individual’s status, they argued, it would
be difficult for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to look the other way. See, e.g.,
United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 379 & n.12 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bea, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). It turned out not to be political suicide for DHS to look the other
way with respect to Arizona’s calls, however, and the Obama Administration went further,
announcing a policy of looking the other way for “dreamers” throughout the country. See
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., I Am a Young Person Who Arrived in the United States
as a Child (Childhood Arrival), U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (2012), http://www
.uscis.gov/USCIS/Resources/daca.pdf.
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made.52 Barron and Rakoff cite the signature regulatory initiatives of the last
two Presidents—President Bush’s No Child Left Behind Act, and President
Obama’s Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act—as evidence of big
waiver’s rise: “Each of these laws sets forth a fully reticulated, legislatively
defined regulatory framework. And yet each has been targeted for nearly
wholesale administrative revision pursuant to seemingly broad waiver
provisions Congress included in the very same statutes.”53
While Barron and Rakoff assess big waiver in traditional constitutional and
administrative law terms—that is, with respect to the branches of the federal
government—these and many other big waiver schemes involve a critical third
party: the states. When the federal executive waives a statutory requirement
and opens the way for rewriting federal law, the states then step in as drafters.
In a variety of significant statutory schemes, the federal executive may unmake
the law Congress has made, but it is the states that remake it.
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), for example, imposes
stringent conditions on state educational systems in return for billions of
dollars of aid. The core of the program requires states to adopt academic
standards, test students based on those standards, and demonstrate “adequate
yearly progress,” culminating in 100% proficiency by the 2013-14 school year.54
Even as it imposes detailed requirements on the states, however, NCLB grants
the Secretary of Education the authority to “waive any statutory or regulatory
requirement of this chapter,” with limited exceptions.55 To receive a waiver, a
state must show, among other things, that the waiving of particular
requirements will improve academic achievement and enable the state to
measure students’ annual progress toward specified educational goals.56
Subject to the Secretary’s approval, then, states may significantly alter the
federal law, and a vast majority of states are doing so. From Maine to Nevada,
Alaska to Florida, forty-two states, as well as Washington, D.C., and Puerto
Rico, are redrafting the federal requirements pursuant to waivers.57 As

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 267
(2013).
Id. at 268.
20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2012).
20 U.S.C. § 7861(a).
Id. § 7861(b).
See Martin A. Kurzweil, Disciplined Devolution and the New Education Federalism (Sept.
25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); ESEA Flexibility, U.S. DEP’T
EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html (last visited Jan.
15, 2014).

1941

the yale law journal

123:1920

2014

Congress has failed to amend NCLB, states have become a disaggregated
national legislature.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) similarly
authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to waive the main
provisions of the Act to allow state innovation that provides health care
coverage at least as comprehensive and affordable as that required by the Act
itself.58 The Act also puts a thumb on the scale in favor of waiver: the Secretary
must notify Congress when she denies a waiver and provide reasons for the
denial.59 While the provision is not scheduled to take effect until 2017, early
signs suggest states may use waivers to substantially revise the statute,
including, in some cases, creating the single-payer health care system that
lacked majority support in Congress.60 Through a series of smaller waivers,
moreover, states are already changing portions of the statutory scheme.61
NCLB and ACA are prominent recent examples, but they are far from
alone. Many other conditional spending statutes allow the states to depart from
federal prescriptions upon receipt of a waiver. For instance, states have received
thousands of waivers under the Medicaid statute and various welfare statutes,
including some that have significantly modified statutory commitments.62 In
each case, states stand in for the federal legislature.

58.

59.
60.

61.

62.

42 U.S.C. § 18052(a) (Supp. IV 2011). The waiver provision reaches the individual mandate
and the sections of the ACA concerning health care insurance exchanges and the minimum
coverage of acceptable plans, among other things. Id.
Id. § 18052(d)(2)(B).
For instance, Vermont has passed legislation to create a single-payer system that would
become effective, pursuant to an ACA waiver, in 2017. See Jessica Marcy, Vermont Edges
Toward Single Payer Health Care, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 2, 2011), http://
www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/october/02/vermont-single-payer-health-care.aspx.
See, e.g., Robert Pear, Four States Get Waivers to Carry Out Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/health/policy/17health.html (noting that Florida,
New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee received waivers allowing insurance companies to
continue providing limited benefit and mini-med plans); Julian Pecquet, Maine Gets First
State Waiver from Healthcare Law Provision, THE HILL (Mar. 8, 2011, 9:26 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-reform-implementation/148179-maine-gets
-reprieve-from-health-reform-insurance-requirement (discussing waiver from ACA
provision requiring insurers to spend at least eighty percent of premiums on care).
See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in THE
HEALTH CARE CASE 227 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013); Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra
note 31, at 1274-76; Theodore W. Ruger, Health Policy Devolution and the Institutional
Hydraulics of the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra, at 359, 366-69. Even
the examples offered above of states serving as a shadow executive branch often involve state
lawmaking. The Clean Air Act, for instance, confers authority on California to act via
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Although what we might call “big waiver to states” contains a nod to dual
federalism—if states were once the exclusive lawmakers in areas like health and
education, today they are critical lawmakers within national programs—it is
also an inversion. The power states have to write the law is not based on their
sovereign status. Instead, it follows from a congressional grant of authority,
subject to federal executive approval and superintendence.63 States serve as
parts of an expanded national government, not separate polities. When they act
pursuant to a waiver, moreover, they instantiate a variety of different versions
of a single national program, not many separate state programs. As is true of
state administration of federal law, then, state authorship of federal law poses a
challenge to conceptions of federalism grounded in autonomy.
It also poses a challenge to conceptions of federalism grounded in
distinctive state interests. States’ various versions of national programs tend to
find supporters and detractors across the country, including within the federal
government. Sometimes federal support and opposition can be mapped onto
the executive and legislative branches; more often, as I will elaborate in Part
III, it is necessary to draw finer-grained distinctions. Modifications of the ACA
such as a single-payer system, for instance, were advanced, though defeated,
during debate on the federal bill.64 State waivers give the losers in that fight a
second chance: indeed, supporters introduced the expansive state waiver
provision at least in part to facilitate state-based single-payer systems.65
Similarly, most states opting out of certain NCLB requirements have adopted
the Common Core standards, a curriculum embraced by President Obama and

63.

64.

65.

waiver, and it was the state legislature that directed the California Air Resources Board to
promulgate regulations concerning greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West 2002).
Cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (advocating for subnational experimentation with regional and
national oversight); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism
in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2012) (arguing that the federal government
should grant discretion to local administrative units while assessing their performance to
induce continuous learning).
See S. Amdt. 2837, 111th Cong. (as introduced Dec. 2, 2009), 155 CONG. REC. 29130 (2009);
see also, e.g., H.R. 676, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing to cover all individuals in the United
States under the Medicare for All Program).
See, e.g., Ezra Klein, Sen. Bernie Sanders: “Vermont Stands a Chance to Be the First State in
the Nation to Pass Single-Payer,” WASH. POST: EZRA KLEIN (Nov. 18, 2010, 2:54 PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/11/sen_bernie_sanders_vermont_sta.html;
see also S. Amdt. 2846, 111th Cong. (as introduced Dec. 2, 2009); 155 CONG. REC. 29216
(2009) (proposing to allow state waivers as of 2014).
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his Secretary of Education but opposed by other states and a number of
congresspersons.66
These examples, particularly the latter, might raise a distinct concern about
the effects of state waivers on the separation of powers. I have suggested, in
contemplating states as co-administrators of federal law, that states may check
the federal executive. Big waiver seems to present just the opposite possibility:
that states may collude with the executive branch to sidestep Congress. Are the
states and the Obama Administration, for example, teaming up to get around
NCLB through initiatives like the Common Core curriculum and Race to the
Top? Rather than save the administrative state from concerns about executive
aggrandizement at the expense of Congress, perhaps states’ role in national
governance exacerbates such concerns.
While further study of these waiver regimes is warranted, early signs seem
to point the other way. For one thing, it bears repeating that Congress drafts
the waiver provisions in the first instance. When the federal executive
authorizes states to amend federal law, it does so pursuant to statutory
authority. And while many fears about executive aggrandizement concern
Congress’s giving away its powers freely rather than the executive’s seizing
them—that is, among other things, the worry about legislative delegation—
states here introduce the sort of multiplicity that is feared lost from unilateral
exercises of executive power. If a leading concern about Congress’s giving its
powers to the executive is that a single actor (or, at least, a single branch) will
have too much authority, including states in these schemes answers the
concern by parceling out authority among multiple actors. As I have suggested
with respect to administration, it is the recasting of checks and balances that is
more significant than the bolstering of preexisting executive-legislative checks.
States that receive waivers not only frame disputes about the powers and
intentions of the branches of the federal government, but also generate
nationwide discussion about federal law.
There is, for instance, more likely to be public visibility and debate when
both the states and the federal executive are cohabiting a statutory scheme.
When they act pursuant to waivers, state officials tend to call attention to the
scheme to trumpet their policy innovation and leadership. So too, even though
waiver schemes are premised on state-federal cooperation—the states have to

66.

See In the States, COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://www.corestandards
.org/in-the-states (last visited Jan. 15, 2014); Peter Wallsten & Lyndsey Layton, Tea
Party Groups Mobilizing Against Common Core Education Overhaul, WASH. POST, May 30,
2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-30/politics/39627200_1_tea-party-groups
-common-core-state-standards-governors.
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receive permission from the federal executive and thus have incentives to play
nice—that does not foreclose antagonism. If the federal executive grants
waivers to certain states and not to others, we can be confident that disfavored
states will complain, and even states that start off cooperative may not remain
so. Recently, for instance, Utah and Nevada sought flexibility in administering
their welfare programs, and the Obama Administration offered to waive the
work participation requirements of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act under the condition that more recipients find
jobs.67 But almost as soon as these waivers became a real prospect, the
Governors of Utah and Nevada criticized the executive for running around
Congress and gutting the statute.68 While states’ ability to place executive
decisionmaking in the spotlight does not fully answer questions about stateexecutive collusion, it reveals that these questions are more complicated than
they first appear. Especially as compared to unilateral executive action, big
waiver to states fosters transparency, accountability, and political debate that
may check rather than enhance federal executive power.69
A second separation of powers point is also noteworthy: big waiver to
states reintroduces legislators as policymakers. On one account of the
separation of powers, Congress is responsible for making the law because it is a
deliberative body whose members are subject to frequent and staggered
elections that make them responsive to the people.70 This type of normative

67.

68.

69.

70.

See Office of Family Assistance, TANF-ACF-IM-2012-03 (Guidance Concerning Waiver
and Expenditure Authority Under Section 1115), U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (July
12, 2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/resource/policy/im-ofa/2012/im201203
/im201203.
See Sahil Kapur, GOP Governors Attack Obama’s Welfare Waivers After Requesting Flexibility,
TPM (Aug. 28, 2012, 4:47 PM), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2012/08/gary
-herbert-brian-sandoval-welfare-waivers-romney.php. The dispute was a partisan one:
Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney had made welfare reform waivers a piece of
his campaign against Barack Obama shortly before the two governors changed their tune.
For more on partisanship’s role in our federal system, see infra Section III.A.
Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 62, at 239 (“Given the erosion of private rights of action and the
extremely limited (at best) judicial review of an agency’s failure to take enforcement action,
there is likely to be no effective legal check on an agency that is bound and determined to
resist the requirements Congress has imposed on states that receive federal funds. The most
effective checks are likely to be political. And a waiver regime, honestly engaged, can provide
the opportunity for political debate, contestation, and accountability.”); Barron & Rakoff,
supra note 52 (defending big waiver); Ruger, supra note 62, at 369-71 (arguing that the
federal executive has incentives to tolerate state variation in the administration of major
social programs).
See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 19,
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matchmaking gets lost in the administrative state when members of the
executive branch are setting policy. But big waiver to states tends to rematch
the policymaking function with the legislative branch. Of course, it is the state
legislative branch, not Congress, but state legislatures are also deliberative
bodies subject to frequent elections. The administrative state’s conflation of
legislative and executive authority, coupled with big waiver’s conflation of state
and federal lawmaking, thus presents an opportunity to restore legislatures as
lawmakers within a national domain of administration.
iii. politics: federalism as staging ground
Taking administration seriously poses a challenge to one aspect of the
federalism literature’s insistence on state-federal separation: the focus on state
autonomy. But integration runs deeper still. Not only do states participate in
federal statutory schemes as administrators or drafters; in so doing, they also
tend to further interests that cannot neatly be said to be state interests. Instead
of opposing the federal government writ large or advancing distinctive statebased interests against national interests, states’ role in federal statutory
schemes empowers them to instantiate competing views of national policy—in
particular, competing Democratic and Republican views—that exist at both the
state and federal level.
This merging of state and national interests is not limited to cooperative
federalism schemes. Even when states are not carrying out federal law, they
stage competition between the Democratic and Republican parties and enable
national networks to translate discrete political agendas into law by harnessing
the tools of direct democracy. Partisanship and political networks do not so
much offer states channels to vindicate their particularistic interests as enable
them to flesh out nationwide controversies. As with administration, attending
to how states pluralize, rather than stand apart from, national politics best
captures federalism’s contemporary vitality.
A. Partisan Federalism
If state administration of federal law injects diversity and competition into
federal schemes, what generates this diversity and competition? Once we
accept that state challenges to the federal government find supporters and

19; see also M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 603, 624-25 (2001) (ultimately rejecting this approach as unsatisfying).
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detractors at both the state and federal level, it no longer makes sense to focus
on distinctive state and national interests. More often than not, it is
competition between the Democratic and Republican parties that motivates
state challenges to particular federal policies. Such challenges advance one set
of national interests against another set of national interests, not state interests
against national interests.71
Return for a moment to some examples from Part II: greenhouse gas
emissions, immigration, education, and healthcare. In each case, fights that
wear federalism’s garb are revealed, upon even a cursory inspection, to be
partisan warfare. When California fought with the Bush Administration about
the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act, the state
advanced approaches to regulation that had previously been broached, without
success, by Democrats in Congress; Senate and House Democrats, in turn,
supported California’s waiver application and investigated the EPA’s denial.
The cleavage was primarily partisan—Democrats wanted to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions and Republicans did not. But this partisan fight
played out in federalist terms because California’s role in the statutory scheme
gave it a unique set of tools.72
So too, the fight between Arizona and the Obama Administration has been
a partisan one.73 Republicans at both the state and federal level have sided with
Arizona, while Democrats at both the state and federal level have sided with the
Administration. Again, states are critical players because they can take actions
that federal politicians cannot. Arizona passed its own law and forced a

71.
72.

73.

For accounts richly complicating the categories of “state” and “national” interests generally,
see Gerken, supra note 23; Resnik, supra note 2; and Rodríguez, supra note 31.
In the pending Clean Air Act case EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., see supra note 44,
the partisan lineup is reversed: now it is a Democratic federal administration attempting to
regulate more aggressively, while a group of Republican-led states challenges this action,
and a group of overwhelmingly Democratic-led states supports the federal agency. See Brief
for the State and Local Respondents, EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., Nos. 121182 & 12-1183 (U.S. argued Dec. 10, 2013) (representing challenger states Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin); Brief for the States of New York et al. as
Respondents in Support of Petitioners, EME Homer City Generation, Nos. 12-1182 & 12-1183
(representing Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, Vermont, and the District of Columbia in support of the EPA).
See generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism:
A Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074 (2013) (arguing that state immigration laws are not
responses to regionally specific policy concerns but rather the result of partisan
entrepreneurialism).
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confrontation with the federal executive branch instead of simply stating an
opposing view on the floor of Congress.
While the No Child Left Behind Act initially seemed a hallmark of
bipartisanship—the rarest of bills championed by both President George W.
Bush and Senator Edward Kennedy—recent months have seen partisan fights
over its implementation. A growing number of red states are opting out of the
Common Core, arguing that this National Governors Association-spearheaded
curriculum amounts to a federal takeover of education.74 Once again, a national
partisan debate looks like a debate about state versus federal authority. Because
they have become the relevant legislators and administrators, state politicians
who dislike NCLB exercise powers that their federal counterparts lack, even as
they are supported and goaded by federal actors.75
Perhaps the clearest example of partisan competition in recent years
involves the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Almost all of the
wrangling has assumed a state-federal cast: it was a group of states that sued to
invalidate the Act as overstepping federal authority, and it is today states that
are refusing to expand Medicaid and to set up insurance exchanges. Yet these
resistant states are united by one thing—the Republican Party affiliation of
their leaders—and they have been supported by federal Republican politicians,
no surprise given that the Act was a Democratic President’s signature
achievement and not a single Republican member of Congress voted for the
bill. Meanwhile, Democratic states have aligned themselves with the Obama
Administration.76 The arguments we are hearing for state versus federal
authority are real enough, but they are motivated by individuals’ partisan
commitments, not which level of government they inhabit.
In these and many other instances, we see political actors using state and
federal governments to articulate, stage, and amplify competition between the

74.
75.

76.

See, e.g., Wallsten & Layton, supra note 66.
See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, Common Core Standards Attacked by Republicans, WASH. POST:
ANSWER SHEET (Apr. 19, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer
-sheet/wp/2013/04/19/common-core-standards-attacked-by-republicans (quoting a Republican
National Committee resolution opposing the Common Core as “an inappropriate overreach
to standardize and control the education of our children so they will conform to a
preconceived ‘normal’” and a letter from Senator Charles Grassley proposing to remove
federal funding for state adoption of the Common Core).
See Robert N. Weiner, Much Ado: The Potential Impact of the Supreme Court Decision
Upholding the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 62, at 69, 69-72
(describing the partisan lineup in the ACA litigation).
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political parties. This phenomenon—which I call partisan federalism77—
follows from the integration of state and federal actors in two key respects.
First, the state and federal governments operate in overlapping rather than
separate domains; from emissions regulation to immigration, from healthcare
to education, no regulatory domain is either the federal government’s or the
states’ alone.78 Second, our political parties have become ideologically cohesive
and polarized at both the federal and state levels. Democratic state
officeholders in Missouri, Mississippi, and Montana today have much more in
common with each other and Democratic federal officials than they would have
in the middle of the twentieth century. Occupying the same regulatory space as
the federal government while being governed by representatives of polarized
political parties, states become critical platforms for the party out of power to
fight the party in power in Washington.79
In contrast to existing accounts’ suggestion that the partisan integration of
state and federal actors preserves a space for states to advance their separate
interests, today’s partisan integration is integration all the way down. More
often than states seizing on their connections to federal politicians to further
distinctive state ends, we see state and federal actors alike seizing on states’
powers to further shared partisan ends.
Partisan federalism thus reorients our understanding of contemporary
federalism. Rather than posit integration as a basis of separation—treating
regulatory overlap and partisan cohesiveness as means by which states may
advance particularistic state interests—it leads us to recognize that integration
yields integration, that regulatory overlap and partisan cohesiveness render
states and the federal government a single stage for national partisan
competition. The challenge posed to federalism scholarship by taking politics
seriously is perhaps even more substantial than that posed by taking
administration seriously. Not only do states participate in the project of
national governance, but state and national interests are one and the same.
Again, this challenge underscores the need to think in more nuanced terms
about the national side of federalism. States’ critical role in staging partisan
conflict concretizes the diversity of interests that may be properly understood

77.
78.

79.

Bulman-Pozen, supra note 27.
Sometimes, as with environmental law, regulatory concurrency is full-blown. Other times,
as with immigration, the federal government is the dominant actor, but states have a
credible enough claim to regulatory authority to test the boundaries, and the very blurriness
of these boundaries facilitates substantive debate.
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 27, at 1083-1108.
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as “national.”80 When states challenge federal policies on partisan lines, they
flesh out competing partisan positions that cannot simultaneously be
instantiated by the federal government. While the minority party in Congress
makes speeches or engages in obstructionism, states rely on a distinct set of
powers. They may, for instance, enact their own legislation to dissent from
federal policy and chart a different course. Or they may administer federal laws
in ways not intended or welcomed by the federal administration. Because party
politics, and not something about state authority as such, is the motivating
force, states undertaking these challenges find supporters and detractors both
in the federal government and among the fifty states. Furnishing a variegated
institutional terrain for substantive political conflict, states make real and
visible for all Americans various partisan alternatives.81
Focusing on partisanship also suggests that states multiply opportunities
for Americans’ national identification.82 As much social science literature
teaches us, partisanship is a powerful sociopolitical identity that informs not
only what we believe about particular issues, but also how we understand
ourselves as Americans and how we form communal attachments.83 If
partisanship binds Americans to the nation and to each other, so too does it
create the conditions for disaffection and estrangement when one’s party is out
of power in Washington, and in particular when one’s party does not hold the
presidency.84 In such instances, states become important sites of partisan
identification: Americans who feel alienated from the federal government can
turn to the states and know there are government institutions controlled by
their “team.”85 This form of state identification inheres not in something

80.

81.
82.
83.

84.

85.

See generally Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and
Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2100 (2014) (arguing that we must “de-center[] the
national from the federal” and recognize that “state and local debate and regulation can
serve national interests”).
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 27, at 1083-1108.
See id. at 1108-22, 1130-35.
See, e.g., DONALD GREEN ET AL., PARTISAN HEARTS AND MINDS (2002); NANCY L.
ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS (2008); Thomas M. Carsey & Geoffrey C.
Layman, Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the
American Electorate, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 464 (2006); Paul Goren, Party Identification and Core
Political Values, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 881 (2005).
See, e.g., Zachary P. Hohman et al., Identity and Intergroup Leadership: Asymmetrical Political
and National Identification in Response to Uncertainty, 9 SELF & IDENTITY 113, 122-23 (2010)
(finding that Democrats’ national identity is threatened by a Republican president, and vice
versa).
GREEN ET AL., supra note 83, at 83, 219; see Bulman-Pozen, supra note 27, at 1130-35
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categorically distinctive about the states vis-à-vis the federal government, but
rather in their shared ability to represent the political parties yet the divergence
in how they do so at any given time.86 Partisan identification with states may
therefore be a way of affiliating with the nation while distancing oneself from
the current federal government.87 Appreciating states as national actors
underscores that state identification need not be opposed to national
identification but may be a means of preserving it.
B. Networked Interests and Direct Democracy
While competition between the Democratic and Republican parties
animates much state-federal divergence, there are many political issues that
don’t inform national partisan competition, whether because they are subject
to ample intrapartisan dispute, too small and seemingly insignificant to
consume the parties’ attention, or just too new to have yet established a
partisan valence. For individuals invested in these issues—ranging from the
labeling of genetically modified foods, to the prevention of animal
mistreatment, to the recognition of assisted suicide—states are the
governments that translate political commitments into practice. Yet these
issues are not “state” issues in any necessary sense. Not in a legal sense: the
federal government could set policy or alter existing policy. And not in a
communal or identitarian sense: there are individuals throughout the country
pushing for reform; these are not local issues of interest only to particular
states’ residents. When states engage these political struggles, they do so on
behalf of people both inside and outside their borders, and they are supported
and opposed by Americans nationwide. These are, then, state issues in a much
thinner instrumental sense. Because it is easier to pass new state laws than new
federal laws, time and again states prove more accessible fora for nationwide
movements to promote their ultimately national agendas.88

86.
87.

88.

(considering the possibility of identifying with states one does not inhabit).
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 27, at 1118.
Cf. DAVID WALDSTREICHER, IN THE MIDST OF PERPETUAL FETES: THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN NATIONALISM, 1776-1820, at 246-93 (1997) (arguing that in the early
Republic, regional parties contested particular federal policies while claiming to represent
the real United States). See generally SACVAN BERCOVITCH, THE RITES OF ASSENT:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1992) (describing an
American ideology that privileges dissent as a distinctly American form of consensus).
See David B. Truman, Federalism and the Party System, in FEDERALISM: MATURE AND
EMERGENT 115, 125 (Arthur W. MacMahon ed., 1955) (“The separate political existence of
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Indeed, a critical difference between the forms of state and federal
governance underlies a good deal of this activity: nearly half of the states
recognize some version of direct democracy. While the Democratic and
Republican parties are increasingly shaping such contests,89 ballot initiatives
and referenda create a space for lawmaking outside the usual partisan
processes, a popular nonpartisan (rather than bipartisan) space that does not
exist at the federal level. Notably, however, participation in state referenda and
initiatives is not limited to state residents. Only state residents may vote at the
end of the day, but the gathering of petition signatures, the get-out-the-vote
efforts, the staffing of campaigns, the advertising, and, underlying most of this,
the bankrolling tend to come from outside the state as much as inside of
it. State-level direct democracy thus provides a forum for Americans
nationwide to participate in political contests that may fall outside of national
party politics.
Consider, for instance, the movement to legalize marijuana. This is a
decidedly national movement. Yet individuals and groups across the country
advocating legalization are not focused on the federal government. Instead,
they are looking to the states, relying on direct democracy by bringing
nationwide resources to bear on particular state initiative contests. Recognizing
that the public was more willing to support medical marijuana than were either
Democratic or Republican politicians, for instance, various national groups,
such as Americans for Medical Rights, NORML, and the Marijuana Policy
Project, began in the 1990s to seize on state ballot initiatives to push for the

89.

the states . . . provides effective access to the whole governmental structure for interest
groups whose tactics may be local or sectional but whose scope is national.”); cf.
Rapaczynski, supra note 22, at 388 (“[T]he existence of effective local authorities is an
independent factor in allowing certain vital interests to organize.”); Judith Resnik et al.,
Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of
Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (2008) (considering how translocal
organizations of government actors import and export law across state and national
boundaries). See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can
Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007) (exploring the interaction
between state and federal lawmaking and especially the ways states can drive Congress’s
agenda).
See Dan Smith, The Initiative to Party: The Role of Political Parties in State Ballot Initiatives, in
INITIATIVE-CENTERED POLITICS: THE NEW POLITICS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 97 (David
McCuan & Stephen Stambough eds., 2005); see also Ethan J. Leib & Christopher S.
Elmendorf, Why Party Democrats Need Popular Democracy and Popular Democrats Need
Parties, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 69 (2012) (arguing that party democracy and popular democracy
should be brought into “pragmatic symbiosis”).
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legalization of medical marijuana.90 Since 1996, twenty states have legalized
medical marijuana, more than half through ballot initiatives.91 And in these
contests, out-of-state individuals and groups have provided critical support.92
Americans across the country have appreciated state initiatives as a way to lay
the groundwork for national change, whether through the sort of cascade of
state laws that has in fact occurred93 or perhaps by ultimately triggering a
change in federal law.
More recently, the legalization movement has focused on a bigger target:
legalization of all personal use of marijuana. Again, direct democracy has been
the critical means for national groups to advance this ultimately national goal.
In 2012, voters in Washington and Colorado approved measures legalizing
personal use of marijuana, the first successes for the movement following
defeats in several other states. The official sponsor of Washington’s Initiative
502, New Approach Washington, included staff members who also worked for,
or had recently left positions with, the ACLU and NORML,94 and nearly twothirds of the funds for the campaign were raised outside of Washington.95
Colorado’s campaign was similarly financed primarily by out-of-state funds
and enjoyed the support of staff from national organizations.96 As with the
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See Kathleen Ferraiolo, From Killer Weed to Popular Medicine: The Evolution of American Drug
Control Policy, 1937-2000, 19 J. POL’Y HIST. 147, 162-68 (2007).
See Medical Marijuana, PROCON.ORG, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource
.php?resourceID=000881 (last updated Dec. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Medical Marijuana].
See, e.g., Ferraiolo, supra note 90, at 162 (noting that Americans for Medical Rights was
“behind nearly all of the successful initiative efforts”); Our History, MARIJUANA POL’Y
PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/about/history.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (touting
MPP’s involvement in various initiative contests).
Cf. Resnik et al., supra note 88, at 726-28 (arguing that we should “reappraise the propriety
of conceiving of states in the singular rather than appreciating their role as a collective
national force”).
See, e.g., Officers & Staff, NEW APPROACH WASH., http://www.newapproachwa.org/content
/staff (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (stating that the campaign director was “on loan” from her
position at the ACLU).
See New Approach Washington, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POL., http://www
.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/committee.phtml?c=12263 (last visited Jan.
15, 2014) (analyzing contributions by geographic location and characterizing 64.8% of the
money contributed to the committee as “Out of State”).
See John Ingold, Colorado Marijuana-Legalization Amendment Spending Tops $3 Million,
DENVER POST, Oct. 21, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21820068/colorado-marijuana
-legalization-amendment-spending-tops-3-million (“Both sides report receiving more
financial support from outside the state than from inside it.”). In total, committees
supporting the amendment raised nearly $3.5 million, of which more than $3.2 million came
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ballot initiatives to legalize medical marijuana, Americans nationwide
recognized the contests in Washington and Colorado as national, not purely
local, political contests.97
The movement to legalize marijuana is far from the only political
movement that has turned to state ballot initiatives to achieve national ends.
The term limits movement that swept the country in the 1990s was a national
one that progressed through state initiatives.98 The movement to label
genetically modified foods is currently focusing on direct democracy, as out-ofstate donors provide funds both for and against labeling.99 From ballot
initiatives that would either recognize or prohibit same-sex marriage, to those
that would ban fracking, to those that would protect animals from

97.

98.
99.

from out-of-state sources. Amendment 64: Legalizing Marijuana, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN
STATE POL., http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/ballot.phtml?m=956
(last visited Jan. 15, 2014). On staffing, compare, for example, John Ingold, Colorado
Marijuana Activists Buttoned Down to Win Legalization Measure, DENVER POST, Nov.
11, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21973903/colorado-marijuana-activists-buttoned
-down-win-legalization-measure, with Staff, NAT’L CANNABIS INDUSTRY ASS’N, http://
thecannabisindustry.org/staffs/staff (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
In addition to furnishing a model that may be adopted elsewhere, state initiatives also affect
how federal law is carried out in the shorter term. While state legalization of marijuana does
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mistreatment, recent years have witnessed a host of other direct democracy
contests fueled by networked interests.100
National networks pushing national agendas through the states pose a
serious challenge to conceptions of federalism grounded in distinctive state
interests. One might try to resist this framing by telling stories linking
particular initiatives to particular state, or at least regional, cultures. Perhaps
the fact that Colorado and Washington legalized marijuana, for instance,
indicates there was something peculiarly western about these initiatives. Yet
multiple stories can always be told: if the legalization of marijuana may be tied
to a libertarian, western identity, so too may the fact that some police officers’
groups want to legalize marijuana tie the cause to a law-and-order rationale.
The way in which initiatives spread from state to state complicates efforts to
ground them in particular state cultures and to limit the stories we tell about
them. For example, states that have legalized medical marijuana by initiative
include Alaska, Arizona, Massachusetts, and Michigan, hardly a unified
regional group.101 Narratives linking state ballot initiatives to distinctive state
cultures are likely to be opportunistic. And there is no getting around the fact
that what differences do exist across the states tend to be grounds not for truly
local grassroots organizing, but rather for targeting by national movements
looking for the most fertile ground to plant their policy ideas. Ultimately, these
contests can only be fully understood by accepting their national dimensions:
they are generally spearheaded by national groups, they attract substantial outof-state support and opposition, and the ultimate goal is nationwide change.
Americans throughout the country are seizing on the states to advance national
agendas.
To frame these contests as national is not to deny the significance of the
states; it is to reconceptualize their significance, to stop focusing on statefederal separation and to instead embrace states as important national actors.
States are critical sites for national contests insofar as they allow national
networks to find a toehold and translate their political commitments into law.
And states help shape nationwide policy, as other states follow suit, as support
builds so that federal politicians take up the issue, or even as organized
interests that have opposed federal action come to realize that disparate, and
perhaps more stringent, state laws are worse than a single national regime and
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thus begin to push for federal regulation.102 States extend the arena for national
governance beyond Washington, D.C., generating more opportunities for all
Americans to advance their political commitments. Indeed, the same cultural,
political, and technological forces that undermine the distinctiveness of states
qua states make it easier for Americans nationwide to know what is happening
in a variety of states, to push for changes in different states, and to understand
other states’ actions as bearing on their lives.
conclusion: federalism’s afterlife
Announcing dual federalism’s passing, Corwin wondered whether the
states could be “saved for any useful purpose, and thereby saved as the vital
cells that they have been heretofore of democratic sentiment, impulse, and
action.”103 Our existing answers to this question seek to preserve state
autonomy and distinctive interests while proposing new channels for the
protection of these forms of state-federal separation. Yet today state and federal
governance and interests are more integrated than separate. Instead of focusing
on the life or death of American states as autonomous, independent actors, we
should think more seriously about federalism’s afterlife as a form of
nationalism.
Acknowledging the conjunction of federalism and nationalism gives us new
purchase on states’ contemporary role. As this Essay has explored, states
frequently act as co-administrators and co-legislatures in our federal statutory
schemes; they carry out federal law alongside the executive branch and write
the law alongside Congress. Lacking an autonomous realm of action in critical
areas, states nonetheless imbue federal law with diversity and competition,
aligning themselves with certain federal actors to oppose others. As differences
that exist in Washington, D.C., assume concrete form in the states, states also
affect checks and balances across the branches of the federal government. We
must consider the separation of powers to understand federalism, and so too
must we consider federalism to understand the separation of powers.
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States do not only set national policy as key players in federal statutory
schemes; they also advance a variety of national interests, rather than
particularistic state interests. States play out competition between the
Democratic and Republican parties, expanding the governance tools of the
party out of power in Washington. And they offer staging grounds for national
networks seeking to advance their agendas in discrete state fora by, for
instance, harnessing direct democracy. In these various respects, states
participate in national political competition on behalf of all Americans, and
individuals throughout the country look to the states as well as the federal
government to represent their interests.
Taking administration and politics seriously ultimately points not to
preservation of traditional conceptions of federalism, but instead to a new antiessentialist view of states and their role in our compound republic. States need
not enjoy an autonomous sphere of action nor advance distinctive state
interests. Precisely insofar as they are disaggregated sites of national
governance, not separate sovereigns, they continue to serve as vital cells of
“democratic sentiment, impulse, and action.”104
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